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Introduction
In most economies, electricity is regarded as a backbone sec-
tor, as it is hard to find an economic agent that would not be
its customer. By this virtue, the soundness of the electricity,
or power, sector can serve to reflect the health of the econ-
omy as a whole (assuming regulation is constant, since poor
regulation is a negative factor). Conversely, the soundness of
the electricity sector is a prerequisite for the smooth opera-
tion of the rest of the economy.
Non-payments for electricity have lately evolved into a sys-
temic practice in Ukraine. In policymaking, as well as in en-
terprise management, non-payments are frequently treated
as an inevitable phenomenon anywhere. However, the scale
of non-payments in Ukraines power sector is spiraling out of
control, threatening the reliability and integrity of the power
system, while non-monetary settlements have acquired a life
of their own.
This policy paper is intended to illustrate policy challenges
faced by Ukraines decision-makers while undertaking eco-
nomic restructuring, using the example of Ukraines power
sector, which has been praised for its advanced market
structure. The paper is organized into four sections: (1) the
Introduction, with background material on key definitions
and a profile of Ukraines electricity sector; (2) Evolution
and scope describes the history and extent of non-payments
in the sector-specific and broader economic contexts; 3)
Causes and effects identifies key aggravating factors, as well
as underlying reasons (in the authors opinion), for non-
payment accumulation and briefly reviews the major reper-
cussions for the sector and the whole economy; (4)
Solutions evaluates policy efforts undertaken to date and
infers policy recommendations for tackling non-payments.
By virtue of its being a
backbone sector, the
soundness of electricity
sector is almost a mirror
reflection of the health of
the economy as a whole.
Also, inasmuch as it is
an essential supplier for
almost every single
household or enterprise,
the soundness of the elec-
tricity sector is a prerequi-
site for the smooth operat-
ing of the rest of the econ-
omy. This policy paper is
intended to illustrate
policy challenges faced by
Ukraines decision-
makers, while undertak-
ing economic restructur-
ing, using the example of
Ukraines power sector.
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Terms and Definitions
For the sake of better understanding of the points made by
this paper, we shall start with definitions of the key terms
used throughout.
NON-PAYMENT is the failure to deliver payment in an accept-
able form for provided goods or services (in our case, elec-
tricity supply or transit) within an acceptable time frame.
Acceptable form of payment would customarily be under-
stood to be cash or cash equivalent. In this case, the peculi-
arities of the Ukrainian economy in general, and the electric-
ity sector in particular, give rise to other acceptable forms
of settlement, such as barter and veksels. An acceptable time
frame of payment delivery is normally equal to 1 montha
typical arrangement for utilities. Failure to deliver payment
acceptable to suppliers is recorded as arrearsan overdue
account payable in the customers books and an overdue ac-
count receivable in the suppliers books.
BARTER is frequently used in a broad sense to define all non-
monetary types of settlements.  In case of the electricity sec-
tor, barter is the exchange of goods and services for the sup-
ply of electricity. For example, an electric engineering en-
terprise supplies equipment to a power generating company
(genco) in return for electricity.
In addition to traditional forms of barter, settlement mecha-
nisms practiced in Ukraines electricity sector often include
so-called debt offsets and veksels.  OFFSETS can be defined as
settlement of payment arrears via cancellation of mutual li-
abilities (exploiting the effect that a liability of one party is
an asset for another).  The simplest and most obvious exam-
ple is when only two parties are involved, e.g., a power distri-
bution company (disco) and the government, where the
former owes taxes to the latter, while the latter owes the for-
mer for electricity consumed by state budget-financed cus-
tomers.
In a VEKSEL SETTLEMENT, a power company (energo) would
accept as payment for supplied electricity a promissory note
(bill of exchange, or veksel) issued by the customer at its par
value (specified on the note, which is to be redeemed by the
issuer on the maturity date). The accepting party (here, the
energo) has the option to sell the veksel to a third party prior
to the maturity date.  The market would price such a prema-
ture veksel at a discount, thereby reflecting the time value of
money as well as the creditworthiness of the issuer (who is
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the ultimate source of veksel redemption). In Ukraines elec-
tricity sector, an important modification of the veksel settle-
ment is the transfer order mechanism, which is a payment
mechanism between the Energorynok members by transfer-
ring the rights over receivables (redeemable in electricity
supply).
Settlements of electricity bills in Ukraine frequently entail a
complex combination of veksels, offsets, and barter; for in-
stance, veksels are common facilitators of barter and offset
schemes. Sometimes it is extremely difficult to discern be-
tween them, therefore, the collective term NON-MONETARY
SETTLEMENTS, encompassing all three, is widely used
throughout the text.
For those readers for whom Ukraines power sector is a terra
incognita, the next section provides an introduction to the
sectors framework within which the problem of non-
payments is to be examined.
Profile of Ukraines power sector
The power industry of Ukraine, with over 51,000 MW of in-
stalled capacity, is ranked the second largest in Central and
Eastern Europe (after Russia) and comparable to that of It-
aly.
Comparative profile of electricity sector
Installed
Capacity
(GW)
Utilization
, 1998 (%)
Generation
structure
Net exports
(% of gen-
eration)
Ukraine 51.5 39 47% thermal;
44% nuclear,
9% hydro
0
Russia 205.6 38 70% thermal,
18% hydro,
12% nuclear
2
Hungary 7.4 55 59% thermal,
40% nuclear,
1% hydro
-6
Poland 33.0 47 97% thermal,
3% hydro
2
Source: World Bank, UN Energy Statistics Yearbook
Ukraines electricity generation has been declining since
1990, though the rates of contraction are slower vs. the aver-
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age across the economy as a whole. In 1998, power genera-
tion volumes slipped below 172 TWh,1 or 58% of historical
peak level (in 1990). Such a rapid contraction in generation
activity, driven by a combination of demand-side and supply-
side factors, has translated into a noticeable increase in ex-
cess capacity margin (about 50%).
Electricity generation vs. Overall economy
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Source: Derzhkomstat, Minenergo.
The weight of residential electricity consumption increased
from 11% in late 1991 to 18% by early 1999, while that of
industrial users contracted from 64% to 54% for the same
period.
Power consumption patterns, 1997
kWh
per
capita,
1996
KWh
per USD
of GDP,
1996)
House-
hold
share
(%)
Indus-
try share
(%)
House-
hold
tariff
(USD/
MWh)
Indus-
trial tar-
iff
(USD/
MWh)
Ukraine 3,194 2.01 18 54 22
YE98
31
YE98
Russia 5,114 2.21 29 51 18 42-62
Hungary 3,199 1.01 34 40 63 56
Poland 3,160 1.75 18 48 72
1996
44
1996
Source: World Bank, IEA, authors calculations.
                                                            
1TWh = 1,000 GWh = 1,000,000 MWh = 1,000,000,000 KWh
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This has occurred despite household tariffs being raised
from 24% of industrial in 1994 (US$3.4/MWh vs.
US$14/MWh) to 72% as of early 1999 (US$22.2/MWh vs.
US$30.9/MWh). Again, the government has announced a
20% rise in household tariffs to be effective April 1, 1999.
Though a step in the right direction, this adjustment still
falls short of 100% cost recovery for household power supply.
Breakdown of retail tariffs in Ukraine
USD
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1996 avg 1997 avg Aug-98 Jan-99
Industrial
Household
Agri
Source: Minenergo, World Bank, authors calculations.
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE/REGULATION: Being an infrastructure
sector, Ukraines electricity market is heavily regulated; its
two major regulators are the National Electricity Regulatory
Commission (NERC) and the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine
(Minenergo). Responsibilities of the former include issu-
ance/monitoring of operating licenses and tariff setting,
while the latter is ostensibly a policymaking arm of the gov-
ernment in the sector. Minenergo is also vested with the
authority to exercise trust management of state-owned stakes
in electric utilities.
Ukraines power industry has been formally unbundled since
1995, while its operating in Pool mode was launched in 1996.
Previously, Ukraines power sector was made up of 8 regional
integrated utilities (Lvivenergo, Vinnytsiaenergo, Kyiven-
ergo, Odesaenergo, Dniproenergo, Kharkivenergo, Kry-
menergo, and Donbasenergo).
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Present industry structure
On the wholesale sell-side the power tariff, which is set at the
hourly spot market, is made up of two components: system
marginal price and capacity availability payment. The former
is the highest gencos bid accepted for each hour, while gen-
cos bids are met in merit order, i.e., from lowest to highest.
In bidding, gencos are allowed to include only their short-
run variable costs.
The wholesale tariff on the buy-side equals the wholesale sell-
side tariff, adjusted downward for power supply from nuclear
and hydro generators (which operate under fixed long-run
tariffs) and adjusted upward for costs of dispatching and sys-
tem operation. The retail tariff, in turn, is structured as the
wholesale buying tariff plus low-voltage network operating
cost plus administrative cost of retail supply. Retail tariffs are
regulated and set by the NERC (apparently by cost-plus for-
mula), while consumer heating tariffs are set by municipal
authorities.
PRIVATIZATION STATUS: Assets in the Ukrainian electricity
sector27 regional power distributors and 4 thermal genera-
torshave been completely privatized. Under the current
legal framework, nuclear power plants, hydro generators,
NERC (tariff set-
ting/licensing)
Minenergo (state
interests)
2 hydro
gencos
9%
Inde-pen-
dents 2%
Regulatory
Authorities
1 nuclear
genco
44%
4 thermal
genco
45%
Generation
Wholesale Electricity
Market (Pool)
Transmission
Ukrenergo
National Dispatch Center (NDC)/
Energorynok (state transmission wholesaler)
(wholesale market
dispatch/transmission)
26 discos
(distribution/sales)
77% of purchases
Independents
(sales only)IES
23% of purchases
Distribution
Sales supply
Consumption Customers
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transmission, and district heating facilities are excluded
from privatization.
A prerequisite for tender/public offering is completed buy-
out (on privileged terms) by managers and employees, which
has already been closed at all privatizable energos. The cur-
rent privatization strategy is to sell discos first, with majority
stakes in 7 of them already acquired by private parties. Priva-
tization offerings of gencos, which was intended to be ar-
ranged via international tenders involving qualified interna-
tional advisors, are still deadlocked.
Though privatization plans envisage significant stakes to be
sold to insiders, by now most of their holdings has been
channeled to outsiders (institutional or strategic investors).
To date, it may be stated that almost 40% of Ukraines elec-
tricity supply is controlled by private parties; this includes
over 23% of privately controlled discos plus over 16% of IES.2
Private generation (less than 8%) is represented only by IES
(generating mostly from leased blocks) and imports (mostly
from Russia) operated by private IES.
Evolution and scope
Evolution of non-payments
In tracing the evolution of the non-payment problem in
Ukraines power sector before 1996, the data available is not
so much limited as restrictive. Analysis is further compli-
cated by the structural break in 1996/97, when Ukraines
power sector switched to the Pool mode of operation, i.e.,
the vertically integrated structure was split horizontally into
generation, transmission, and distribution. Nevertheless,
evidence suggests that the non-payments problem emerged
after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, when
early attempts were made to replace administrative allocation
of resources with market-oriented allocation.
Recent data suggests that accounts receivable of Ukraines
electricity sector (Minenergo enterprises) exceeded 5.4 bn
UAH (equivalent to 1.6 bn USD) as of early 1999, which con-
stitutes a drastic leap from 207m UAH (less than 200m USD)
as of late 1994. If calculated as a percentage of GDP, the con-
sumer debts increased by a full percentage point, from 3.1%
as of late 1997 to about 4.1% as of late 1998.
                                                            
2 With deduction of Energoatom and other state-owned energos.
Non-payments in
Ukraines power sector
have reached a critical
scale, threatening the
reliability and integrity of
the power system, while
non-monetary settlements
have evolved into a sys-
temic problem. Starting
back in the early 1990s,
accumulating non-
payments for power bills
have resulted in arrears
of 1.6 bn USD or over
4% of GDP. It is trou-
blesome that, unlike its
Central European coun-
terparts, Ukraine never
succeeded in breaking the
trend of deteriorating
payment discipline since
the start of the transition
in 1992.  This raises
questions about the ade-
quacy of reform policy
choice and implementa-
tion.
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Evolution of non-payments
Averaged as % of GDP
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Accumulation of non-payments in Ukraines
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The upward trends in the sectors non-payments have been
developing against the background of growing arrears across
the economy, e.g., in inter-enterprise settlements, tax pay-
ments due, wage payments, principal and interest payments
on bank loans. For instance, the increase of payables owed by
local enterprises was from 44% of GDP in 1993 to 116% (!)
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in 1998, while the reported amount of overdue payables3 ap-
proached 75% of GDP in 1998.
Breakdown of aggregate enterprise payables
as of Jan 1 99
Other goods/ 
services
56%
Taxes
14%
Other
15%
Labor
6%
Veksels
2%
Electricity
7%
Source: Derzhkomstat, authors calculations.
Breakdown of Minenergo receivables
as of Jan 1 99
Agri
11%
Other
20%
Heavy industry
30%
Communal
30%
Budget-
fi d9%
Source: Minenergo
Of the payables by Ukrainian enterprises, unpaid electricity
bills are estimated to account for about 7%. Heavy industry
                                                            
3 For utilities, a typical settlement timeframe is 30 days, while for
other sectors (e.g., mechanical engineering) it may be as long as 90
days.
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and communal sectors account for 30% each of that amount.
Graphs below illustrate that electricity arrears strongly corre-
late with the financial performance of power consumers
(here, budget-financed institutions, and households).
Payables of budgetary customers for electricity vs.
Aggregate tax arrears of enterprises
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Communal services payables for electricity vs.
Wage/pension arrears
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To better grasp the extent of Ukraines non-payment prob-
lem, it helps to compare it with the same issue in both Russia
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(common background and similar economic/reform set-
tings) and Hungary and Poland (the regions success stories,
and with a similar industry structure). It turns out that pay-
ment collection performance in Ukraine is very similar to
that of Russia despite the structural differences of their
power sectors. The extent of the problem faced by the elec-
tricity sectors of these economies is unheard-of for their Cen-
tral European peers (including Hungary and Poland), which
are more advanced in structural reforms. It is troublesome
that, unlike its Central European counterparts, Ukraine
never succeeded in breaking the trend of deteriorating pay-
ment discipline since the start of the transition in 1992. This
raises questions about the adequacy of reform policy choices
and implementation.
Collection profile of Ukraine/CEE4 power sector
Year of
reference
TL5 Col-
lection
(% of
sales)
Cash col-
lection
(% of col-
lection)
Avg. re-
ceiva-
bles/
GDP(%)
Receiv-
ables/
Sales
(days)
Ukraine 1998 78 16 4.1 191a
Russia 1998 84 18 3.7b 405c
Hungary 1992 85 100 0.5b 54
Poland 1994 90 100 n/a 36d
Notes: a  for discos; b  as of late 97; c  for RAO UES; d - as of late 93.
Source: World Bank, Minenergo.
Barter phenomenon
A notable feature of the non-payment problem in Ukraine is
the non-monetary settlement of bills through barter, veksels,
and/or offsets. In the local enterprises books, those non-
monetary payments are recorded as equivalent to cash pay-
ments. However, non-monetary payment is normally per-
ceived as inferior to cash compensation, due to the higher
transaction costs of barter settlements (need to accept, store,
and re-sell the obtained goods) and lower liquidity.
                                                            
4 Central and Eastern Europe
5 TL = total
Essentially, barter pay-
ments appear to be an
extension of the non-
payment problem, allow-
ing power consumption
by insolvent customers.
With a generally negative
attitude to barter as a
substitute for cash, non-
monetary settlements are
perceived as a necessary
evil on the background of
universal arrears.
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Evaluation of Non-monetary Instruments
Common sense says that hardly any entity of the market would
willingly take non-monetary payment instead of cash. However,
evaluation of non-monetary settlements is not uniform across the
various instruments used.
Non-monetary instruments vs. cash: Generally, non-monetary set-
tlements are treated as a necessary evil, with the main disadvan-
tage being huge transaction costs which inflate operating costs and
drain profits.  In most cases, they result in the redistribution of
profits from energos to barter intermediaries. The latter find barter
mediation to be a natural business, for they can exploit their supe-
rior marketing skills, while state enterprises are used to state orders
rather than marketing. There could be a more benign attitude to
direct barter deals (i.e., only two parties) involving goods/services
that an enterprise needs and would have to buy anyway. There
should be no loss from such deals in an economic sense, provided
the terms of trade are equivalent to cash-based terms.
Offsets vs. cash: Generally, tax offsets are treated as very much
equivalent to cash. Because the tax authorities demand tax pay-
ments in cash, seeking to retain frequently scarce cash proceeds,
enterprises should be willing to substitute offsets for payments of
taxes and keep some of their cash for themselves. However, the risk
is that systematic offsets encourage excessive resource consumption
by budgetary organizations, which in turn means further deteriora-
tion of payment discipline and a movement away from market
mechanisms. This case illustrates the conflict between individual
rationality and the rationality of the system as a whole.
Veksels vs. cash: The evaluation of veksels versus cash depends
very much on their proximity to cash money, which, in turn, is de-
fined by the solvency of their issuer. If the issuer is ready to redeem
them with cash and maintains a good credit history, veksels should
be an adequate cash equivalent, priced at a minor discount. In
Ukraine, the problem is that veksels are issued mostly by cash-
strapped companies (e.g., gencos with cash proceeds below 5%)
that have no way to meet their veksel commitments with cash;
hence, the veksels are traded at fraction of their face value. Instead
they are redeemed in non-monetary form and serve as facilitators of
barter/offset deals.
A common rationale for accepting non-monetary payments is
that it is a second-best option vs. the prospect of not getting
paid at all (akin to the second best argument, given the al-
most universal arrears). But normally, the inability of a cus-
tomer to pay with cash should signal their insolvency, due to
(1) a fundamental inability to create added value; (2) mana-
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gerial inability to raise cash proceeds; or (3) consumption
beyond available means. Thus, the barter sale of electricity
essentially exacerbates the non-payments problem, for it al-
lows the survival of insolvent customers. This hypothesis is
supported by the sectoral pattern of barter salessectors with
highly marketable products (e.g., food and other consumer,
or export-oriented, goods) pay with cash, while problematic
sectors (e.g., heavy industry) live mostly on barter sales.
Overall barter share of sales by sector, 1998
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The limited data for 1997-98 suggests that the share of non-
monetary settlements in commercial goods, electricity, and
tax transactions has been increasing.  Since mid-1997, the
share of barter in power sector sales has more than doubled,
having jumped from 20% of sales up to 50% as of late 1998.
Share of barter (as % of sales)
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However, the barter factor does not account for the whole
weight of non-monetary settlements, for it misses a signifi-
cant part of settlements that use offsets and veksels. This dis-
crepancy is revealed in Minenergos data on payment collec-
tions, which indicates that for 1998 the full weight of non-
monetary settlements was 75%, not 50%.
Share of non-monetary payments in collections
as of year end
1996 1997 1998
DISCOS:
TL Collections (millions UAH) 7,505 7,779 6,528
   Cash (%) 23 18 25
   Offsets/veksels/barter (%) 77 82 75
ENERGORYNOK:
TL Collections (millions UAH) 2,142 7,112 6,115
   Cash (%) 33 12 12
   Offsets/veksels/barter (%) 67 88 88
GENCOS:
TL Collections (millions UAH) 5,515 6,606 5,562
   Cash (%) 11 9 11
   Offsets/veksels/barter (%) 89 91 89
Source: Minenergo.
The comparison of Ukrainian patterns of non-monetary set-
tlements vis-à-vis those prevailing in Russian energos is quite
revealing.  Although comparable in the aggregate, these pat-
terns are different in composition.
Collection: Ukrainian gencos vs. Russian energos
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Note: 1998 data for Ukrainian gencos, Aug-98 data for Russian energos.
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In Ukraine, veksel payments are used much more often than
in Russia, where reliance is greater on barter settlements.
The use of offsets is also more widespread in Ukraine.  These
variations in payment patterns may be explained by struc-
tural differences between the Ukrainian and Russian power
sectors.  Specifically, in the case of Ukraine, the unbundled
industry structure (lack of direct genco-client relationship)
makes barter payments per se excessively cumbersome.  In-
stead, such deals are facilitated by easily transferable veksels
and offsets, which are essentially barter, anyway.
Market Pricing of Power Sector Veksels
Despite its imperfections, Ukraines capital market provides a use-
ful guide as to what the veksels are really worth. Based on prices at
the PFTS (local abbreviation for over-the-counter trading system),
veksels of Ukrtelecom (cash-generating telecom monopoly), the State
Treasury, and the Pension Fund are priced relatively high (15-
40% discounts) owing to strong solvency position of the former
and the option to offset tax/budget liabilities with the latter two.
 In contrast, Energoatoms veksels are priced at almost 80% dis-
count (!), which reflects the inability of the issuer to redeem its vek-
sel liabilities in cash or good cash equivalent. However, there is
quite a significant volatility in the price of Energoatom veksels, as
the graph below illustrates (depending on specific terms of settle-
ment schemes).
Recent price history
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Price per hryvnia at face value
as of 6-Apr-99
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Causes and effects
Technically, non-payments arise from customer insolvency
or their unwillingness to pay. While the former is mostly a
function of management prudence6 and soundness of gen-
eral economic conditions, the latter depends on the strength
of enforcement mechanisms. Both factors appear to have
contributed to the exacerbation of the problem in Ukraine.
Macroeconomic setting
MACROECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT: Difficulties in securing
cash payments arose with the dismantling of the command
features of the former Soviet Ukraines economy; this oc-
curred mostly involuntarily, as Ukrainian trading partners
adjusted their relative prices to resemble those prevailing
internationally. Specifically, under Soviet rule Ukraines in-
dustry had been subsidized by low-priced energy imports
(mostly from Russia) that met most of its energy consump-
tion needs. When prices skyrocketed to world levels (from
less than US$1 per ton of crude oil and 1,000 cu m of natural
gas in 1991 to US$115 per ton and US$77 per 1,000 cu m,
                                                            
6 Here, managerial prudence can affect non-payments in two ways:
1) on the supply side, management should not allow the supply of
electricity to customers who do not or cannot pay; 2) on the
demand side, customers should optimize their costs and/or
restructure to earn enough money for their power bills.
Non-payments arise from
customer insolvency or
unwillingness to pay.
While the former is mostly
a function of
management prudence
and soundness of general
economic conditions, the
latter depends on the
strength of enforcement
mechanisms. The wide
array of causes of poor
payment collections
include macroeconomic
and microeconomic
mismanagement,
deteriorated solvency of
customers, rent-seeking
opportunities, and legal,
regulatory, and
structural impediments,
the source of which is
found in a lack of
political commitment on
behalf of the Ukrainian
government to put the
sector on a sound
financial footing.
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respectively, in mid-1995), the Ukrainian economy experi-
enced a significant shock on the supply side. The overall im-
pact of the disintegrating former Soviet economic and trade
environment was significant for Ukraine, for it had been
rather exposed to internal trade in the FSU (47% of GDP in
1991).
Initially, the government tried to cushion adverse supply and
demand shocks by allowing loose fiscal and monetary poli-
cies, which eventually resulted in hyperinflation that became
an additional source of shocks to the economy. Its major im-
pact was in eroding the purchasing power of residents, weak-
ening the demand-side further, as well as in skewing prefer-
ence to barter as a payment mechanism (second-best option
after hard currency), exacerbated by a rapidly depreciating
local currency.
Macroeconomic profile of Ukraine
GDP
CAGR7
%
90-98
Avg CPI
(90-98)
Avg fis-
cal defi-
cit
(92-98)
% GDP
M2, %
of GDP
Range
93-96
97
GDP
per cap-
ita US$
Energy
imports
% con-
sumptio
n
Ukraine -10.5 189 7.1 32-2 976 50
Russia -6.3 176 6.9 19-3 3,056 -54
Hungary -0.5 23 5.4 42-51(91-96) 4,446 47
Poland 1.8 57 3.0 32-38(91-96) 3,509 0
Source: World Bank, EBRD, authors calculations.
In 1994 it became evident that the loose fiscal and monetary
policies which intended to boost domestic activity were not
sustainable nor in any way effective. The Ukrainian authori-
ties then attempted to tighten monetary policy, as well to
introduce somewhat stricter fiscal discipline. Against the
background of an unrestructured economy, fiscal and mone-
tary austerity measures have caused the build-up of arrears
across the board (in the state and local budgets, payrolls and
inter-enterprise bills), which evolved into a tangled web of
non-payments. About this time, the undermonetization of
Ukraines economy became viewed by many as a reason for
the non-payment knot, and votes for looser monetary policy
began to accumulate.
                                                            
7 CAGR = compound average growth rate
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In a comparative context, Ukraine has performed poorly in
macroeconomic management, and its real sector has under-
gone the deepest contraction vis-à-vis its CEE peers. Yet its
high exposure to energy imports (frequently blamed by local
policy makers) does not seem to be a good enough excuse
for its dire straits (note the similar position of Hungary).
MICROECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT: With those shocks, many
domestic enterprises (especially heavy industry) faced drasti-
cally thinner markets for their products and, hence, huge
over-capacity. One could anticipate downsizing via payroll
cuts (in the short term) and plant shutdowns (in the longer
run) as a necessary adjustment. However, government policy
was reluctant to allow (forget about facilitating) cuts in labor
or enterprise liquidation. Instead, major efforts have been
devoted to keeping enterprises afloat without paying atten-
tion to their fundamentals, while the government, as well as
company management, was and still is preoccupied with
production volumes, rather than profits and efficiency.
Maneuvering between state budget and suppliers
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While public financing (which used to be the main source of
financing) has been shrinking, domestic enterprises, budg-
etary organizations and households have failed to adjust their
consumption accordingly, owing largely to lax budget con-
straints. The graph above illustrates how relaxed budget con-
straints are for Ukrainian enterprises. Soft fiscal discipline
(reflected in the high fiscal deficit during 1997) coincided
with a slower rate of buildup of enterprise debts, while fiscal
austerity during 1998 translated into accelerated accumula-
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tion of debts, as enterprises sought to extend their budget
constraints at the expense of their suppliers.
Industry vs. Budget-financed enterprise arrears
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DETERIORATED ENTERPRISE SOLVENCY: While domestic ac-
counting standards (which are not comparable with the IAS)
are almost meaningless in discerning the financial soundness
of enterprises, the anecdotal evidence, coupled with indirect
indicators (e.g., output dynamics, wage and tax arrears),
strongly suggest that the solvency of Ukrainian enterprises
has markedly deteriorated.
Performance of industrial sector
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At the same time, the lack of incentives for rigorous restruc-
turing and cost-cutting efforts has caused financial distress to
become a persisting feature of domestic enterprises.
DEPRESSED HOUSEHOLD DEMAND: Despite additional income
contribution from shadow activities (the sources and levels
of which tends to be underreported), household wealth and
income positions have also drastically worsened (see graph).
After the hyperinflation of 1993, real household incomes fell
by over half, while their monetary assets (mostly denomi-
nated in local currency) collapsed to a fraction of their initial
value.
Household income position
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The government attempted to cushion the problem of dete-
riorated household living standards by granting electricity
tariff privileges (25% to 100% discounts) to socially vulner-
able and politically sensitive groups of residents, including
the military and police, Chornobyl victims, and veterans,
selecting the beneficiaries based on occupation rather than
on need. The privileges granted over 1.1 million of house-
holds (about 8% of total household customers) cost the elec-
tric utilities (or government budgets if those privileges get
reimbursed) about UAH6.5 mil monthly8  (as of mid-98).
That number does not take into account the subsidy to a
                                                            
8 This amount indicates the revenue shortfall to firms due to
lowered tariffs. The full cost to companies is higher since current
tariffs still do not cover operating costs.
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larger group of agricultural households, accounting for
about 6% of total electricity consumption, that are allowed a
UAH10 discount on each MWh.9
In addition to the creating adverse side effects (such as in-
centives for excessive consumption, burden on the subsidiz-
ing customer groups, and motives for rent-seeking), these
privileges are often not fully funded by the government since
1) legislation does not identify sources of financing for many
of them, and 2) the government has a poor record of meet-
ing its commitments due to chronic shortfalls in revenue.
Legal and regulatory setting
ELECTRICITY IS A SPECIAL GOOD (IF ANY): Under the Soviet
economic system, the electricity sector received peculiar
treatment, as it was thought to be different from a typical
good or commodity (like steel, coal, etc.). Instead, electric
power was regarded as an instrument of Soviet industrial and
social policy. For the first time Ukrainian law on the electric-
ity sector defined power as a tradable commodity in late No-
vember 1997, however this notion has not yet been fully in-
ternalized into practice.
Since the start of economic transition in Ukraine, this defi-
ciency in the perception of electricity has been evident in the
widespread budgeting of payments for electricity as a resid-
ual expenditure item (especially characteristic for state
budget-financed organizations), which has resulted in an
insufficient allocation of funds to cover 100% payment of
electricity bills (or budgets with at unrealistically high as-
sumptions of financing). Essentially, electricity retains its
status of a policy instrument to date. The government ar-
ranges tariff/payment concessions, and imposes cut-off con-
straints for sectors/enterprises it deems crucial, seeking
their recovery. A recent and very illustrative example is the
governmental decision to grant the privilege of an uninter-
rupted power supply to agriculture.10 Though not easily en-
                                                            
9 On the positive side, this discount is set as a fixed nominal amount
rather than a percentage. This means that as retail tariffs for
households increase, the %discount will be shrinking. At the new
household tariffs (UAH130/MWh urban and UAH120/MWh
rural since Apr-99), the discount is less than 8%. Nevertheless, the
real discount is going to be higher, since distribution costs in rural
areas are higher.
10 Presidential Decree ¹215/98 from March 23, 1998. This
decision resulted in the  subsequent replacement of the Minister of
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forceable, especially at the level of private IES and privatized
discos independent from Minenergo, this decision calls into
doubt the governments commitment to restore the financial
viability of the electricity sector.
CUT-OFF CONSTRAINTS: Downstream, power suppliers
managerial efforts to enforce strict payment discipline are
impaired by legal and administrative cut-off barriers. Besides
the list of untouchables defined by the central government,
municipalities as well as oblast administrations have their
own lists of sensitive customer categories, which serve as
grounds for them to intervene in power suppliers cut-off
decisions. According to the law on electricity, local authori-
ties have no right to intervene in the operational regulation
of power consumption.11 At the same time they are vested
with an ambiguously defined authority to participate in the
development of complex plans of power supply to customers
within their domains,12 which is widely practiced.
A related problem is the attribution of liabilities which arise
when a disco suspends electric supply to a delinquent cus-
tomer. In case when a disruption of power supply causes
damage to third parties (as would be the case with environ-
mentally dangerous production processes, hospitals, or kin-
dergartens, for example), the full liability of indemnity is
imposed on the power supplier, although the fault may lie
either with the government, which has not met its financing
commitments, or with the organization/enterprise which
did not fully or realistically budget for electricity costs. Over-
all perception of electricity as a policy instrument rather than
a good or commodity makes problematic the security of
ownership rights on the revenues from power sold. This is
especially true for gencos13 which stand last in the payment
flow chain.
EFFECTIVENESS OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE: In addition to
the problems attributing liability for payment arrears, the
rules for bankruptcy proceedings in Ukraine are weak and
ineffective. Although the bankruptcy law is in place, it has
remained void for politically sensitive enterprises and sec-
                                                                                                                  
Energy as its previous incumbent failed (or was reluctant) to
enforce it.
11 Law on Electricity, Art. 10.
12 Law on Electricity, Art. 10.
13 The issue gets complicated by a peculiarity of electricity as a
commodity  it cannot be stored in inventories.
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tors (e.g. agriculture, large industrial enterprises). The lack
of a working bankruptcy procedure is attributed mainly to
insufficient political commitment and (related) persistence
of an extensive list of state-controlled enterprises.
TARIFF REGULATION: The inflexibility of tariff regulation,
resulting from the indecisiveness of the Ukrainian authori-
ties about introducing competition, seems to be a problem,
especially for discos. Specifically, discos are put at competi-
tive disadvantage vs. IES, as tariff regulation still allows for
cross-subsidization of households and agriculture (for which
tariffs are set lower than the economic average cost of sup-
ply) at the expense of industry (tariffs set higher than eco-
nomic cost). At the same time, IES (which are also called un-
regulated tariff suppliers), which are not trapped in tariff
rigidities and cross-subsidization obligations, are able to of-
fer electricity at discount tariffs. Industry insiders also claim
that IES are exploiting transfer-pricing in their barter pay-
ment schemes, that allows them to offer better terms for
electricity sold. Some discos have reported that IES started
encroaching on their household clientele (the top cash payer
in the sector) by offering lower tariffs, while compensating
incurred losses with gains from transfer-pricing in barter set-
tlements with industrials. As a result, discos are losing most
solvent customers to IES, that, in effect, deteriorates their
collection record further and channels available cash re-
sources to independents (who tend to exhibit a low pass-on
rate of their cash collected).
Recently (late 1998) the NERC attempted to address this
problem by introducing some flexibility in tariff setting for
discos: specifically, any disco can now adjust, at its own dis-
cretion, the tariff within a range of up to +/-9%. This gives
discos some room for competing with IES for good quality
clients. NERC regards this band as sufficient for a disco to
outbid an IES, although it may not always be the case14.
As of mid-1998, residential power tariffs, which are set in lo-
cal currency terms, were adjusted to cover 80% of costs.
However, since then the local currency has depreciated dra-
matically, approaching a depreciation depth of 90% vs. US
dollar by April 1999. Since power generation costs are mostly
hard-currency based due to the proportion (about 80%) of
                                                            
14 For instance, if an IES buys electricity with an NDC veskel (which
was purchased at a 50% discount), then its cost of power supply
should be significantly lower.
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fuel (coal, natural gas, oil, nuclear fuel) to inputs, the cost
coverage ratio has deteriorated considerably.
The inadequacy of the residential tariff undermines the fi-
nancial position of power suppliers in two ways: 1) suppliers
bear direct losses as tariffs fall short of incurred economic
costs (especially those suppliers for whom households consti-
tute the largest clientele); and 2) local industry, which is
struggling for survival, is unfairly burdened by cross-
subsidization, which again contributes to the deterioration
of payment discipline (many industries regard the power
tariff as illegitimately high). Though they have an inherently
higher cost of supply, as of early 1999 household tariffs made
up only 70% of the industrial ones. Ukraines household tar-
iff cost-coverage level compares favorably with that in Russia
(where residential tariff is at least 20% lower), but it falls
short of prevailing tariff cost-coverage in the much sounder
Polish and Hungarian power sectors (the Ukrainian house-
hold tariff is roughly one-third of the tariffs in these two
countries).  Obviously, inadequate household tariffs have
negative repercussions on the payment flow further up-
stream.15
Recently some industry insiders (mostly cash-strapped gen-
cos) have started advocating tariff cuts conditioned on full
cash payment, as they do not see possibility of collecting
100% payment at current tariff levels. The advocates of this
move do not perceive the adverse impact on their financial
results to be significant since: 1) their financial results are
inflated anyway, as they are based mostly on non-monetary
transactions; 2) non-monetary payments (even 100% at cur-
rent tariff) imply the same monetary losses to gencos (due to
higher transaction costs, inflated valuations of bar-
ter/veksels, etc.) as would be the case under lower tariffs
with full cash payment; and 3) companies anticipate cash
gains from reduced tax liabilities due to elimination of
virtual profits (to be elaborated below).
TAXATION, though appearing not excessive by European
standards, is stated to be burdensome by enterprises which
often have cash collections below 20% (hardly enough to
meet tax and wage bills16, not to mention other operating
                                                            
15 Upstream = producers  in this case, power generating (or
importing) companies.
16 It is abnormal to have wage arrears in an industry where labor
costs account for no more than 5% of total operating costs.
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expenses).  Tax liabilities ignore the fact that frequently prof-
its are inflated by barter and are non-monetary  they are still
claimed to be paid in cash at a 30% rate of balance profit.
In addition, the tax burden on utilities customers seems to
affect their cash collection. In particular, those enterprises
which have tax arrears and hence are on kartoteka,17 are pre-
vented from paying their power bills with cash (even if they
are willing to) because the tax authorities seize all their cash
proceeds (effectively translates as 100% marginal tax rate)
until their tax arrears are redeemed.
STRUCTURE OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: The non-
payment problem is exacerbated by the current structure of
the regulatory framework. Minenergo has retained its key
role in the sector, which extends to the operational man-
agement of the energos, while NERC has not established it-
self as a fully independent authority. On the background of
this regulatory dichotomy, the Minenergos authority has
been recently challenged by privatization of majority stakes
in a number of discos (they even suspended reporting to the
Ministry), as well as entrenchment of independents.
Regulatory profile
Independe
nt regula-
tor?
Household
/
Industrial
tariff ratio
Bankruptcy
procedure
CIT 18 rate
Ukraine Developing 0.7 Inadequate 30%
Russia No 0.4 and less Inadequate 35%
Hungary No 1.1 Adequate 18%
Poland Yes 1.6 Adequate 40%
Source: World Bank, authors calculations:
Sector structure related
SECTOR LEVEL: Not rarely, industry insiders point out that
the unbundling of the power sector was an aggravating factor
in the non-payment problem. Although a number of CEE
countries with similar power market structures (notably Po-
                                                            
17 Special procedure applied when a firm has tax arrears: all cash
proceeds to the firm are garnisheed.
18 CIT = Corporate income tax.
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land and Hungary) have not encountered Ukraines scale of
non-payments, and Russia with its integrated power sector
structure faces a comparable extent of non-payments, there
are a number of reasons supporting the validity of this argu-
ment.
Structural profile of Ukraine
Competiti
on policy
(from 1 to
4+)*
Structure of
power sec-
tor
Sector owner-
ship break-
down
Share of
independen
ts
Ukraine 2 unbundled Gencos: state-
controlled
grid: state-
owned
discos: mixed
generation:
2%
supply: 16%
Russia 2+ integrated State-
controlled
generation:
none
supply: n/a
but actually
significant
Hungary 3 unbundled gencos: mostly
private
discos: private
grid: state-
owned
Generation:
n/a
supply:
none
Poland 3 unbundled Gencos, grid,
discos: state-
owned
Generation:
n/a
supply:
none
* ranked measure taken from the EBRD Transition Report 1998.
Source: World Bank, EBRD Transition Report 1998,
authors calculations
The unbundling of the power sector and introduction of the
Pool (Energorynok) have exacerbated the problem in the
following way: by being an exclusive buyer of power from
gencos and the exclusive seller to discos and IES, the Pool
dilutes payment responsibility of the latter (the ultimate col-
lectors of payments) vis-a-vis the former.  Under the current
market scheme, gencos claim payments from Energorynok,
which in turn claims payments from discos and IES.  A set of
problems arises in this chain:
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1) Discipline of the discos in transferring collected payments
to Energorynok is increasingly deteriorating with their priva-
tization. Specifically, privatized discos are reluctant to pass
on their cash collections, seeking to retain as much cash as
possible while trying to substitute their cash payments due
with non-monetary instruments;
2) Rules regarding fund allocation by Energorynok are nei-
ther transparent nor fair, which causes striking variation in
collection performance between gencos and discos/IES, as
well as among gencos.19
Enforcement of payment delivery from Energorynok to gen-
cos is impossible because: a) Energorynok, being a subsidiary
of Ukrenergo, which in turn is under the auspices of Mi-
nenergo, is not a legal entity and as such, its legal liability for
non-payments cannot be established (it is not subject to
bankruptcy proceedings); b) pooling of electricity at the En-
ergorynok level rules out the possibility to trace delinquent
buyers (i.e., discos or IES) in order to hold them liable for
their payment arrears.
ENERGORYNOK VS. ENERGOMARKET: The dependent status of
Energorynok seems to create a legitimacy problem for power
market agents, especially private IES and privatized discos.
Specifically, its subordination to Minenergo makes it essen-
tially an administrative mechanism, and in many ways it still
follows the Soviet system of power supply allocation. The ab-
sence of independent legal status and corresponding absence
of any enforcement mechanisms at the disposal of Energo-
rynok contribute to the common perception that Energo-
rynok is not a true market instrument.  This perception cre-
ates incentives to hide/retain collections downstream
(especially by private discos), as well as does not motivate
better cash collection.
GENERATION: A crucial issue in the structure of Ukraines
power sector is that arrangements for competition in the
electricity market are virtually absent. Hypothetically, under
free competition the low-cost nuclear and hydro gencos
would be first to dispatch.  If fully used, their capacities
(17,300 MW of nuclear and hydroelectric) would generate up
to 150 TWh of power (or 87% of 1998 generation), leaving
the remainder for the thermal generators (34,000 MWh).
                                                            
19 Though Energorynok allocates cash proceeds on a pro rata basis,
the companies weight can be manipulated resulting in a higher or
lower cash collection.
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Clearly, most thermoelectric capacities would have to be re-
tired, even with optimistic demand growth assumptions un-
der this scenario.
FAIR COMPETITION ISSUE AMONG SUPPLIERS: The issue of
fair competition practices is also relevant. Seeking a secure
fuel supply for Energoatom, Ukraines nuclear power genco
(which accounts for over 40% of all generation in the coun-
try), the Ukrainian government has granted this genco an
IES  license.20 This has allowed the company to capture (with
sanction from the government) enterprises producing
liquid goods that can be used as barter payment for electric-
ity supplied by Energoatom. Such liquid products, in their
turn, would be used to pay the Russian TVEL, the monopo-
list fuel supplier for Ukraines nuclear plants, for nuclear
fuel shipments.
While Energoatom and other big players win government
support, small private IES are experiencing discriminatory
treatment. For instance, IES are administratively kept away
from cash-paying customers (e.g., households, non-
industrials).  Also, the authorities (Ukrenergo) frequently
(but on an ad hoc basis) interfere in the terms of IES power
supply schemes, making independent suppliers worse off.
INDEPENDENT SUPPLIERS: The Collection record for IES is
mixed, for the character of this category of power suppliers is
quite diverse and not yet stable (although the structure of
this segment is rather concentrated, with a handful of players
dominating).The biggest IES, accounting for the majority of
non-tariff supply, is Energoatom (nuclear genco); the rest of
the IES can be roughly categorized into 3 groups (by esti-
mated market share, in descending order):
1) less than a dozen private IES which are at par with discos
in terms of their supply volumes (over 500 GWh/yr), owing
to their access to power imports (from Russia) and/or to
operating with Energoatom electricity. Many of them also
lease power generation capacities.
2) over 30 state-owned industrial enterprises with an IES li-
cense, which is used to facilitate power supply and/or to get
payment for fuel supplied to power plants.  In this category,
                                                            
20 To date, most gencos have an IES license, which allow them to get
around the cash crunch at Energorynok by using barter supply
schemes (e.g., power for fuel or equipment),  and also enables
them to sell power to end-users at a discount vs. wholesale tariff.
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the coal mining enterprises, gas producers/suppliers, and
gencos are most prominent.
3) over 100 small-scale (less than 100 GWh/yr) private IES.
Although IES are not immune from most of the problems
encountered by discos, anecdotal evidence supports the idea
that private IES (groups 1 and 3) do have better collection
rates, probably thanks to their independent private (hence,
profit maximizing) management.
PRIVATIZED DISCOS: The privatization of discos, under in the
conditions of absent collection enforcement mechanisms
and continued public operation of other sector players was
accompanied by disincentives for discos to pass on due cash
revenues.  Naturally, with the privatization of majority stakes,
discos aim to maximize their shareholders value (= present
value of all future earnings). As a result, on the positive side,
they became more aggressive and innovative (than their
state-owned counterparts) in collecting payments from their
customers, by impeding non-monetary settlements where
possible, applying a stricter cut-off policy (in some cases even
in defiance of local and central governments), and investing
in better metering and collection systems. Simultaneously,
on the payables side they face a not-for-profit state-
administered Energorynok (and, implicitly, its gencos), as
well as national and local governments, to whom they seek to
pass on the costs of non-monetary settlements and non-
payments, while retaining as much cash collections as possi-
ble. For instance, such discos try to settle all of their tax li-
abilities using offsets (thereby keeping their cash at home)
and seek to minimize cash transfers to Energorynok (and,
ultimately, its gencos) by substituting non-monetary instru-
ments. As a result, while their own (for themselves) payment
collection rates have improved, those of Energorynok and,
consequently, the gencos have deteriorated.
Rent-seeking incentives
The incentives for rent-seeking seem to be abundant and are
concentrated in the following areas:
1. Non-monetary settlements may be encouraged (or fueled,
if you prefer) by the rents they can provide to barter dealers.
The source of rent is the discrepancy between the cash price
and the one set in a non-monetary deal (normally, the latter
is higher). Although the premium on the latter could be jus-
tified by higher transaction costs, the room for unfair gain
lies in the low transparency of such deals. That very feature is
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regarded as inducing the substitution of non-monetary set-
tlements for cash settlements.
 2. Frequent tax offsets arranged by the government (at the
central as well as local levels) induce the deliberate accumu-
lation of tax arrears in expectation of their being settled in a
non-monetary form (thus preserving the highly sought-after
cash funds). In addition, as mentioned above, enterprises
may also benefit from discrete valuations applied in those
offset schemes.
3. The fact that Energorynok (Ukrenergo) retains many of
the soviet-style command features that rest on officials dis-
cretion creates room for corruption. Many power market
agents complain about the complicated and frequently
changing procedures for non-monetary settlements, while
smaller private IES suffer from power abuse and discrimina-
tory treatment on the part of Ukrenergo officials.
 4. Deteriorating public funding has drastically shrunk per-
sonal income, position measured by official salary of gov-
ernment while officials remain highly involved in the power
sector; this increases incentives for, and likelihood of, bribe-
taking. There is also a concern that underpaid energo em-
ployees may collude with customers on electricity theft.
5. Until recently, non-monetary settlements had also been
motivated by tax evasion, as many energos, facing chronic
cash shortages, built up considerable kartoteka liabilities.
Though that incentive is still in place, the introduction of
VAT on barter (and veksel) electricity trade in late 1998 has
reduced the tax evasion appeal (or at least part of it) of
these payment methods.
Technical issues
Cash deficits prevent power suppliers from generating the
cash necessary to address their technical problems (for in-
stance, investing in better metering devices, maintaining
distribution networks, etc.); this, again, is a contributing fac-
tor to poor payment discipline. The impact of technical
problems on payment collections is reflected in the growing
percentage of the distribution power losses (technical as well
as commercial).
Industrial consumption is metered by discos using inherited
metering devices which were designed for large power con-
sumption levels under the assumption of full capacity utiliza-
tion by industrial enterprises. However, with the collapse of
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production activity of many domestic enterprises, such me-
tering devices appear to be inadequate for proper metering
of power consumption due to their low sensitivity and accu-
racy at low consumption volumes.
The problem of proper metering of residential customers is
also acute.  The drastically deteriorated income levels of
most Ukrainian households provide incentives for power
theft, which is possible due to technical deficiencies of elec-
tricity meters.  In addition to poor metering, the payment
collection system in Ukraine is grossly deficient.  Specifically,
(1) meters are read by the residents themselves (thereby al-
lowing for underreporting of actual power consumption lev-
els); and (2) there is no control over timing of payments with
no specific deadlines set for payments.
Ukraines electricity distribution losses
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In addition to deteriorating payment discipline and trans-
mission/distribution networks, growing losses are also at-
tributed to a shift in consumption patterns, whereby cus-
tomer groups, like households, that consume electricity with
inherently high distribution losses (due to their small scale),
have gained in their consumption share at the expense of big
industrial customers who are supplied with low distribution
losses (due to economies of scale). In 1990, households ac-
counted for less than 8% of power consumption, while in
1997 their share approached 18%, mostly at the expense of
large industrial customers.
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Financial and technical impact on the system
The direct impact of cash flow drainage from energos (discos
and especially gencos) due to non-payments is a severe short-
age of working capital, which translates into operating defi-
cits.  Specifically, energos (especially gencos) do not collect
enough cash to meet their own essential cash-based ex-
penses, like wages, taxes, and debt servicing (fortunately low
due to low exposure to debt financing), not to mention the
cash necessary for fuel/equipment purchases, maintenance,
etc.
MECHANICS OF OPERATING DEFICIT: To trace the impact of
non-payments on the economics of power generation in
more detail, let us refer to the income statement of a hypo-
thetical genco  (shown below), which is constructed on the
following simplifying assumptions (which nevertheless do
not take the case far from reality):
· only wages and CIT are regarded as cash expenses,
while other operating expenses are settled in non-
monetary ways;
· to highlight the problem, this hypothetical genco is
taken to be a low-cost power generator, which is evident
from its high profit margin (typical for a nuclear or hy-
droelectric genco);
· balance on extraordinary/non-operating items is zero.
Income statement for a hypothetical genco
% of net revenue
Reported Payment levels
Net Sales 100%
Total Collections 92%
Operating expenses 58%
   incl. Labor 4% Cash collection 7%
Operating margin 42%
Interest/extraordinary 0%
EBT21 42% Remaining cash 3%
CIT 30% 13%
PAT22 29% Tax arrears 10%
Source: Author's calculations, based on 97 financials of Energoatom.
                                                            
21 Earnings before taxes = balance profit.
22 Profit after tax = balance profit minus tax payments.
On the upstream, chronic
cash deficits have
translated into a lack of
capacity to meet power
demand.  This often
results in emergency
demand curtailment,
which is disruptive to
general economic
activity.  At the
downstream, the major
impact of non-payments
is the growth of
technological losses due
to distribution network
degradation from
underinvestment. The
broader economic impact
(in terms of price
distortions, wasteful use
of resources) is less
evident, though hardly
negligible. The non-
payment problem also
seems to call into doubt
the sustainability of the
current Energorynok
pseudo-market
arrangement, and deters
further sector
privatization.
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This simple example illustrates how arrears are set in motion
even under very optimistically assumed conditions. A cash-
strapped energo company may have some room to maneuver
in allocating its scarce cash funds between cost items, yet
there is no way it can achieve a sustainable reduction of its
arrears without drastic adjustments in sales and collection
patterns. This example also illustrates that earnings reported
by Ukrainian energos under local accounting standards are
virtual, as normally a company with a sound profit margin
would not have any difficulty in paying wage and tax bills.
Most energos claim that 20-25% cash collection is a necessary
minimum to meet their cash-based operating expenses (in
the above example it is 17%). So far, many energos (mostly
gencos) are reported to have wage and tax arrears are that
tending to accumulate.  Gencos appear to have greatest wage
arrears, which has sometimes resulted in workers strikes
(thus undermining system reliability further).
This illustration also provides insight into the perverse in-
centive of low cash collection.  Facing regulated tariffs (by
Energorynok for the gencos or by NERC for the discos), elec-
tric utilities are not interested in cutting costs, for that would
increase their tax liability (as discussed in the section on
causes).  Elements of the current taxation system such as
cash-based garnisheeing of tax debts provide incentives to
utilities to inflate their costs and thereby reduce their tax
liabilities.  That incentive also motivates their proposals to
offer tariff discounts, as lower tariffs would reduce their tax-
able income base.
Broader economic impact
The broader economic impact of the problem stems mostly
from the price distortions created by non-payments. Essen-
tially, non-payments reduce the price of electricity and artifi-
cially soften end-user budget constraints, thereby inducing
excessive consumption and encouraging inefficiency of elec-
tricity use (use of electricity per USD of GDP is twice as high
in Ukraine as in Hungary). Also, acceptance of the non-
payment phenomenon allows the survival of economically
inefficient enterprises. More directly, the deteriorating reli-
ability of the power supply has become increasingly disrup-
tive for the everyday activity of enterprises and households,
although its impact is not easily quantifiable.
The negative impact of barter can mostly be described in
terms of price distortions and high transaction costs.  Barter
has also become a vehicle of income redistribution (from
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state-controlled enterprises to private barter dealers) via
transfer-pricing (e.g. by inflating prices for own goods),
which tends to worsen energo terms of exchange (even
though by itself this practice is neutral with regard to eco-
nomic efficiency).
Technical distribution losses
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Age profile of generation capacities, 1998
13-22 yrs
28%
< 12 yrs
15%
23-33 yrs
36%
>33 yrs
21%
Source: Minenergo.
Turning back to the example of a hypothetical genco, al-
though reporting to be operating at healthy 29% profit mar-
gin, the company is already falling short of cash to meet its
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tax liabilities. As a result, the only way our genco can under-
take capital expenditures is through barter (or other non-
monetary schemes). This raises two problems: 1) the com-
pany is likely to be constrained in the scale of its capital ex-
penditures (resulting in an under-investment in refurbish-
ment or modernization); 2) due to the limited availability of
suitable barter partners, the company will be forced to look
for suppliers that would agree on barter settlements rather
than the optimal ones.  As a result, our genco may end up
with low-quality equipment that does not fully address its
needs.
The impact on further reform of the sector
In the light of the unceasing escalation of non-payment prob-
lems, the sustainability of the status quo (that is, a pseudo-
Energymarket with persisting governmental intervention)
seems questionable, and the power sector will have to un-
dergo changes in its rules of the game quite soon.
There are two stable equilibria to which Ukraines power
market structure may gravitate  and these seem to be the
two ultimate options for Ukraines policy makers: either an
integrated state-controlled structure (and here, a logical ex-
tension would be to extend state control over the rest of the
economy) or a full-blown liberalization of the power market.
The second equilibrium would crucially depend on the gov-
ernments commitment (currently widely recognized as in-
sufficient) to put the sector on a sound financial footing.
POTENTIAL OF PRIVATIZATION: The non-payment crisis also
hinders the privatization of energos to private investors.
Fundamentally, the value of an asset is defined by its ability
to generate return for its owner. As most of the Ukrainian
energos (especially gencos) are not in a position to generate
any cash revenues (which can be distributed to shareholders
as dividends), the implied value of those companies should
be low.  Clearly, however, the government, desperately seek-
ing fund raising opportunities, will be reluctant to accept low
bids, while prospective buyers will remain unenthusiastic.
Overall, this translates to delays in the privatization of ener-
gos, which is unfortunate for privatization can potentially
bring better, profit-oriented management, with aggressive
and innovative collection practices.
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Market Values of Ukrainian Energos
as an Indicator of Power Sector Problems
Though the Ukrainian capital market is widely believed to be in-
adequate, it can still provide useful information. Specifically, the
deteriorating state of Ukraines power sector has been priced into the
market values of local energos (gencos as well as discos). Their
current prices are only a fraction of those pre-vailing for their Hun-
garian peers, which operate in a much sounder setting.
Company Price
29/03/99
(USD)
Mkt cap.
(million
USD)
P/
Capacity,
1997
(USD
/kW)
P/Unit
sales,
1997
(USD
/MWh)
GENCOS:
Zakhidenergo 2.54 32.55 7 2
Donbasenergo 0.80 18.84 2 1
COMPARE (PRICES AS
OF 29/09/98):
Dunamenti
(Hungary) 38.2 130.00 61 23
Matrai (Hungary) 36.8 125.00 156 29
Discos:
Donetskoblenergo 0.32 20.84 n/a 1
Lvivoblenergo 0.12 23.20 n/a 7
Poltavaoblenergo 0.70 15.46 n/a 3
COMPARE (PRICES AS
OF 29/09/98):
Titasz (Hungary) 26.5 90.10 n/a 27
Emasz (Hungary) 25.2 78.00 n/a 16
Dedasz (Hungary) 56.6 169.80 n/a 46
Source: PFTS, given companies, ING Barings, authors calculations.
Solutions
Measures taken to date and their impact
ATTEMPTED ANTI-NON-PAYMENT MEASURES: To date, the gov-
ernment has addressed the non-payment problem in the
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power sector by issuing a series of decrees commanding
minimum cash collection rates (e.g., 30% recently) and call-
ing for suspension of power supply to delinquent customers.
So far the impact of these directives has been limited (if any),
for they fail to address the roots of the problem.  Specifically,
they do not alter non-payment incentives, and they lack con-
sistency and coherency in implementation.  The efficacy of
these decrees is also being undermined by a growing number
of concessions to various lobbyists.
While announcing its harsh position against delinquent cus-
tomers and barter, the government contradicts itself by
granting generous privileges and exemptions to such sectors
as agriculture, as well as by facilitating large-scale non-
monetary settlements of power bills. Besides the scheme of
nuclear fuel supply to Energoatom described earlier, a re-
cent example of the latter was Cabinet of Ministers Resolu-
tion No. 1440 dated September 15, 1998, which instituted
the redemption of budgetary arrears with municipal veksels
to provide fuel for thermoelectric gencos and ensure
smooth operation during the 1998/99 winter period.
Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 508 On approving the
financial recovery plan for Ukraines power industry dated
April 18, 1998  the most comprehensive document address-
ing the problem so far -- provides a thorough review of the
measures undertaken by the government.  The timing was set
for the period from Q2/98 to the Q2/99, so by now we can
judge its effectiveness (pp. 38-41):
So far, the plan has failed to meet most of its targets due to:
1) delayed and incomplete implementation of intended
measures; 2) built-in inconsistencies (major exemptions al-
lowed); and, fundamentally, 3) failure to address underlying
incentives for poor payment discipline.
ATTEMPTED ANTI-BARTER MEASURES: Aiming to curtail barter
transactions, in Q4 of 1998 the government introduced 20%
VAT on barter electricity deals. This measure has achieved its
goal to some extent having raised the costs of barter sales of
electricity.  However, the reduction of barter payments has
immediately translated into overall lower collection levels
and a more-or-less status quo situation with cash collections
(since systemic problems remained unaddressed). Facing
lower collection rates and pressure from the gencos, the gov-
ernment altered its position by drafting a resolution which
abandons VAT on barter, providing yet another indicator of
economic policy inconsistency.
Attempted solutions by
the Ukrainian authori-
ties have not reversed the
trend of accumulating
payment arrears, as they
failed to address the roots
of the problem by not
altering the incentives,
and lacked consistency
and coherency in imple-
mentation. Suggested
general policy level and
sector level solutions need
to be guided by and sour-
ced in the commitment of
Ukraines policymakers to
make the local power
sector financially sound,
by replacing Energorynok
with Energomarket. In
addition, the potential of
micro (utilities-level)
solutions for improve-
ment of cash collections
should not be ignored.
Significantly, incentives
for those solutions are
rooted in privatization.
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Financial recovery plan approved by the Ukrainian government,
18 April 1998
Measure Expected results Implemen-
tor/
Controller
Time
frame
Evaluation of im-
plementation to
date
COST CUTTING
1. All non-cash settlements
(including offsets) are to
be done through banks
Cost savings of
around 100-300m
UAH/yr due to
reduction in bar-
ter volumes plus
effects from
measure 2.
Energos/
NBU1
Starting
1-May-98
Not followed
2. Gencos are to purchase
fuel with cash resources
only (remainder after
wage, maintenance, and
tax payments)
Cost savings of
around 100-300m
UAH/yr with
addition of ef-
fects from meas-
ure 1.
Energos/
Minenergo,
MinFin
Starting
15-May-
98
Essentially not fol-
lowed as cash re-
sources are not
adequate even to
cover wage and tax
liabilities
3. Gencos are to buy fuel
with cash on competitive
tender basis
Cost saving of
100m UAH/yr
due to lower fuel
costs
Energos/
Minenergo
Starting
1-Jun-98
Essentially not fol-
lowed as virtually
no cash available
for fuel
4. Determine payables of
discos and gencos as of 1-
Jan-98, to be restructured
and redeemed during 5-yr
term.
Energos,
Minenergo,
creditor-
ministries/
MinFin
Arrears
to be de-
termined
and
agreed
by 15-
May-98
Not implemented
TARIFF ADJUSTMENT
5. Switch to market-based
tariff setting, envisaging
uniform household tariff
throughout Ukraine
Full cost recovery
of power supply
by customers to
ensure reliable
operation of the
wholesale market
Discos and
other tariff
suppliers/
NERC
By stages:
1-May-98,
1-Aug-98
and fin-
ish by the
end of 98
Partially imple-
mented (20% in-
creases in house-
hold tariffs on 1-
May-98 and 1-Apr-
99)
6. According to the Whole-
sale Market Rules, deter-
mine the payments due to
suppliers and generators,
and order the distribution
Create a profit-
making envi-
ronment for
companies with
superior man-
NDC/
NERC
Starting
1-May-98
Essentially void
due to Minenergo
interventions
                                                            
1 National Bank of Ukraine
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of payments according to
the Market Funds Admini-
stration Procedure.
agement, while
minimizing
wholesale market
regulation
7. Prepare and submit
draft legislation on cancel-
ing tariff privileges based
on occupation, as well as
establish consumption
limits for privileged cate-
gories of households.
About 53m UAH
savings annually
Minenergo,
NERC,
Min-
Economy,
Ministry of
Labor
Starting
1-Jun-98
Prepared, how-
ever, no steps
taken for further
implementation.
ENFORCEMENT OF PAYMENT DISCIPLINE
8. Tariff power suppliers
to promptly suspend elec-
tricity supply to customers
with arrears (except for
cases stipulated by legisla-
tion). Make local admini-
strations liable for inter-
ventions in cut-offs
Improved pay-
ment collection
Discos, Min-
istry of Jus-
tice
Starting
15-May-
98
No consistent or
complete imple-
mentation
9. Power for budgetary
organizations to be sup-
plied only within the
budgeted-for amounts
Suspension of
free power sup-
ply
Discos/
Minenergo,
MinFin
Starting
1-May-98
Not effective by
nature (even if
fully imple-
mented) as actual
budgets fall short
of planned.
10. Transfer the Market
Funds Administration
from the NDC to NERC-
licensed Energorynok.
Establishment of
transparent and
reliable system
for Pools funds
administration
that amount to
around 10 bn
UAH/yr.
Minenergo,
NERC
1-Jul-98 Delayed.
11. Enforce compulsory
use of clearing accounts
for all disco proceeds, as
specified in the Pools
Funds Administration
Procedure.
Making sure that
discos pass on
their collections
Minenergo,
MinFin
1-Jun-98 Poor compliance
(especially on be-
half of privatized
discos)
12. Prepare proposals (for
Parliament) on the rein-
statement of fines for late
payments of power bills by
budgetary organizations
and households.
Stronger pay-
ment discipline,
reduced arrears
for consumed
electricity
Minenergo 1-Jun-98 Done
Non-payments in Ukraines Power Sector
Policy Studies, May 199940
CLEARING OF ARREARS
13. Determine amounts
and execute offsets against
arrears for consumed
power of budgetary or-
ganizations and state con-
trolled enterprises using
the NBUs Bank Offset
Mechanism
Reduced arrears Energos,
Minenergo,
MinFin,
local ad-
ministration
s/
NBU
1-Jun-98
for
budgetar
y,
1-Nov-98
for en-
terprises
The NBUs Bank
Offset Mechanism
is not regularly
followed
14. Determine the amount
of payables exceeding
more than 3 months for
major non-budgetary cus-
tomers. Restructure this
amount into marketable
interest-bearing debt in-
struments
Accelerated
clearance of non-
budgetary arrears
Discos,
Minenergo
1-May-98
for cus-
tomers
with over
1m UAH
overdue
1-Aug-98,
if over
0.1m
UAH
overdue
Delayed (but
hardly very effec-
tive due to de-
pressed and illiq-
uid domestic fi-
nancial markets)
15. Establish payment col-
lection departments
(adequately staffed) at all
discos to conduct regular
and vigorous legal actions
against delinquent cus-
tomers
Liquidation of
arrears
NDC, dis-
cos,
Minenergo
1-Jun-98 Implemented at
privatized (on
their own) and at
some state-
controlled discos
with foreign advi-
sor backing
16. Ensure redemption of
budgetary arrears for elec-
tricity and heat
(rescheduled for 5 years)
which include veksels of
the State Treasury and lo-
cal administrations
Improved work-
ing capital for
energos as well as
better borrowing
conditions
MinFin,
Local ad-
ministration
s
1-Oct-98 Arrears resched-
uled but imple-
mentation is below
100% (while new
arrears are build-
ing up).
PRIVATIZATION
17. Transfer state holdings
in privatizable energos to
winners of privatization
tenders for trust manage-
ment
Improved man-
agement of the
energos to be
translated into
higher market
values for state
holdings
SPF2,
Minenergo
Within
two
months
of tender
sale
Inconsistent and
non-transparent
moves resulted in
delays in energo
privatization.
18. Execute tender sale of Raising funds for SPF, Min- Finalize Chronic resched-
                                                            
2 State Property Fund.
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at least 25%+1 stakes in all
discos against investment
commitments, with option
of trust management of
state holdings.
state treasury as
well as for the
financial recov-
ery of the sector.
Fin, Min-
energo
sale by
Q2/99
uling due to in-
flated tender terms
and lack of consis-
tent efforts
(disagreements
between Min-
energo and SPF).
19. Execute tender sale of
4 thermal gencos against
investment commitments
Raising funds for
state treasury as
well as for the
financial recov-
ery of the sector.
SPF, Min-
Fin, Min-
energo
Finalize
sale in
Q2/99
2 tenders
(involving interna-
tional investment
banks as advisors)
are halted due to
disagreements
over tender terms.
Under current
collection rates,
market values of
gencos are negli-
gible.
20. Review the implemen-
tation of steps 17-19 and
develop sector privatiza-
tion plan for 1999
Improved effec-
tiveness of priva-
tization process
Financial
Recovery
Commission
15-Nov-
98
Delayed to mid-
April 99.
MANAGEMENT
21. Control implementa-
tion progress as well as
quarterly status reports to
CabMin
Improved effec-
tiveness of plan
realization
Financial
Recovery
Commission
Starting
1-May-98
Formally done
(problems with
control).
22. Reporting on financial
performance indicators
(see table 10)
Regular monitor-
ing of target at-
tainment
Minenergo On a
monthly
basis
Implemented.
23. Draft appeal to WB to
reinstate loan for Electric-
ity Market Development
Project based on the initial
performance of the Finan-
cial Recovery Plan, as well
as request reallocation of
the loan funds for meter-
ing and communication
devices required for im-
plementing hourly tariffs
and voluntary demand
curtailment.
Obtain 241m
UAH for power
market develop-
ment
Minenergo,
MinFin
1-Aug-98 Done.
Source: Cabinet of Ministers, World Bank, authors data.
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The policy of local authorities on the privatization of electric
utilities has also been inconsistent to date.  One of the major
reasons for that irregularity has been the clash of interests
between the State Property Fund (SPF) and Minenergo.
Both of these institutions are responsible for the privatiza-
tion of energos; however, they pursue different objectives.
The former is concerned with maximizing immediate cash
proceeds from potential sales for the state budget, under
austerity pressure.  The latter seeks to maximize investments
over the long run in order to finance the weighty capital
needs of the sector. As a result of that conflict of interests,
plans for the privatization of energos have been frequently
amended, with excessive tender terms being introduced for
minority stake offerings (e.g., rigid scheduling of investment
commitments for ambitious capital expenditures).
The authorities suspended further sales and began to con-
sider other options after numerous tender offerings of disco
stakes failed to attract solid strategic investors during 1998.
These options included transfer of controlling stakes in dis-
cos to the trust management of local administrations, and
transfer of state holdings in a number of discos to the trust
management of local banks (which, reportedly, have strong
ties with local authorities).  However, to date the implemen-
tation of those options has been reversed or is in stalemate,
due to no apparent gains in cash collections, as well as oppo-
sition from Minenergo.
Among other recent initiatives, the Ukrainian authorities are
struggling to impose greater administrative control over
disco accounts, to ensure full passing-on of collected cash to
Energorynok.  They are also considering moving gencos
closer to the collection process via direct genco-client (disco)
contractual arrangements, which would alter the designed
pool operation.
Solution proposals
Many believe that solutions to the non payment problem
should be found and developed in a broader context e.g.,
political commitment to make the sector financially viable,
achievement of overall economic recovery, industry restruc-
turing and revival. Frequently suggested policy steps sug-
gested at this GENERAL POLICY LEVEL include:
1) strict enforcement of the cut-off policy with regard to de-
linquent customers;
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2) reduction of power tariff privileges; where privileged cus-
tomer groups would remain, the financial burden of paying
for such privileges should be fully born by the government;
3) payment discipline of the government itself should be
maintained by prudent budget planning and control.
Perhaps it will sound banal, but at this level the solution for
Ukraine lies simply in the political will and commitment of
the government to restructure the domestic economy, in
order to follow competitive market principles and to put the
electricity sector on a solid foundation. Without the backing
of structural adjustments new laws mandating higher cash
collections, or tax concessions or looser monetary policy
(presumably to tackle the undermonetization problem)
would have marginal (if any) impact on the financial state of
Ukraines power sector, and could turn things for the worse.
SECTOR LEVEL: By now it is almost obvious that the current
power market structure (with the involvement of Energo-
rynok) is neither satisfactory nor sustainable.  Here, struc-
tural changes may follow two opposite paths:
1) Energorynok, which failed to develop into a real market,
should be abandoned and energos should switch to the di-
rect genco-disco (customer) supply relationships on a re-
gional basis.  This would boost cash collection at the genco
level by simplifying the payment scheme and by establishing
clear responsibility for the delivery of collected cash.
2) Energorynok should be refined to resemble the real mar-
ket and to address its asymmetries in payment collection and
distribution.  Specifically, it should break away from Mi-
nenergo and get established on an independent basis, with
adequate enforcement mechanisms at its disposal. It should
have the status of an independent entity, with its Board
elected by founding participants.  Only after the Energo-
rynok is established as an independent and self-regulating
market, the Pool participants would be able to conclude
meaningful agreements clearly specifying the obligations to
pay for supplied electricity.
Although shifts in the sector structure (from unbundled to
integrated or vice versa) appear to be significant in the redis-
tribution of cash resources, per se they do not much affect
the overall cash collection in the sector, since the customer
base and its payment discipline and solvency characteristics
stay the same.  The same holds true for barter. Bans and re-
strictions on barter operations will not be effective or sus-
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tainable as long as there is no framework enabling economic
viability and discipline through effective bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, lifting of cut-off restrictions, etc.  In turn, this de-
mands the drastic restructuring of many enterprises.
UTILITIES LEVEL: Solution measures may include:
1. maintaining an uncompromising stance regarding accept-
ing non-monetary payments instead of cash;
2. introducing incentives for sales personnel to increase cash
collection (e.g., bonuses for cash collections above set target
and/or revenue-sharing when lost (stolen) power found);
3. switching to billing for electricity by invoice;
4. upgrading metering devices to improve metering accu-
racy, as well as preventing misuse (i.e., electricity theft).
Micro-level solutions are important as they provide the po-
tential for significant improvement in collection rates. The
variety and vigor of implementing these microeconomic so-
lutions rest on private enterprises incentives to turn electric
utilities into profit-making businesses.  That drive and its
results are among the most important benefits of sector pri-
vatization.
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Ukrainian policy development process. This is achieved by increasing the
know-how of key government officials for policy choices, formulation,
and debate, and the awareness of the public-at-large of the benefits of the
policy. ICPS focuses on key programs of importance for the reform efforts
of the government.
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